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The Risks and Rewardsof Criminal
Activity:A ComprehensiveTest
of CriminalDeterrence
W. Kip Viscusi,Universityof Chicago(Visiting),
Northwestern
and NBER
University,

Whereaspreviousanalysesof criminaldeterrencehave focusedon
theeffect
of criminalenforcement
on crimerates,thisstudyanalyzes
the existenceof compensatingdifferentials
forcriminalpursuits.By
analyzing the risk-rewardstrade-off,this approach representsa
morecomprehensive
testof the criminaldeterrencehypothesis.The
sample consisted of black inner-cityyouths who reportedtheir
crime participation,crime income, and self-assessedrisks from
crime.The riskpremiumsforthe threeprincipaladverseoutcomes
(arrest,conviction,and prison) constitutedbetween one-halfand
two-thirdsof all crime income on the average,providingstrong
supportforthe criminaldeterrencehypothesis.
I. Introduction
The economic approach to crime closely parallels the analysis of
hazardousjobs. In thecase of job safety,it is theprobabilityof an injury
and its severitythat constitutesthe unattractive
featureof the job. For
Thispaperis partofa largerresearch
projecton criminal
behavior
supported
in partby a U.S. Department
of Laborcontract
withNBER. Donald Watson
provided
capableresearch
assistance.
Helpfulcomments
wereprovided
atvarious
stagesof theresearch
by RichardFreeman,
HarryHolzer,PhilipCook, and
M. Duncan.
Gregory
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criminalpursuits,theprobabilityis thatof apprehensionand conviction,
while the loss is that imposed by the individual'sincarceration.The
parallelsare mostdirectforrisk-neutral
individualswho view theadverse
outcomesin termsof monetaryequivalents;in each case thereis some
expectedloss fromthe riskyundertaking.
For individualsto be willing
to incurtheserisks,theremustbe some otheroffsetting
advantage,such
as a compensatingwage premiumfor risk or a comparativelyhigh
financialreturnfromcrime.'
Notwithstandingthe similaritiesin the conceptual structureof the
individual'sdecisionproblem,therehas been verylittlerelationbetween
the empiricaltestsof the two theories.Whereasthe analysisof the risks
fromlegitimateopportunitieshas focusedon compensatingdifferentials
for risk,the crime literaturehas dealt with the effectof variationsin
criminalenforcement
on the degree of criminalactivity.The research
that has been undertakenin this vein providesevidencein supportof
criminaldeterrencethat is relativelystrongand diverse,as Freeman
(1983) indicatesin his recentoverviewof the crimeliterature.
The existenceof a varietyof studiesin supportof criminaldeterrence
does not, however,implythat the criminaldeterrencefindingsare not
controversial.
Many of the resultshave been questioned,forreasonsthat
stemlargelyfromthe natureof the aggregative
data used in past studies.
There have been four principal criticisms.2First, measurementerror
regardingthenumberof crimesgeneratesa spuriouscorrelationbetween
the crimerate dependentvariable and criminalenforcement
variables,
levels
such as the total arrestsper crime.Second, criminalenforcement
and crimeratesmay be simultaneous,leadingto a complicatedidentification problem since thereis no solid conceptual basis for excluding
predetermined
variables.Third,the clearanceratevariables(e.g., arrests
per crimeor prison admissionsper crime)do not reflecthomogeneous
crimeactivities,
and themixof crimesis affected
by criminalenforcement
efforts.
Finally,some of the time seriescrimerate equations have not
been stable and yield resultsthat are sensitiveto the particularfunctionalform.
In addition to these criticismsthat have appeared in the literature
thereis an additionalpotentialproblemsince past studieshave focused
primarilyon the relation between crime and criminal enforcement.
Ideally, one should also take into account the financialrewardsfrom
'The principal
initialformulation
ofthiseconomic
modelofcriminal
behavior
was byBecker(1974).Fora reviewofthesizableconceptual
literature
on crime,
seeHeineke(1978).
2 Withtheexception
of theobservations
on theclearancerate,whichappear
in Cook (1980),all fourempirical
problems
arereviewed
byTaylor(1978).Also
see Ehrlich(1973)foran influential
empirical
analysisand Witte(1980)fora
recent
study.
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crime since these payoffsaffectboth the crime rate and the level of
enforcement
chosen by the community.The primarymatterof concern
to the potentialcriminalis not the crimerisk per se but whetherthe
frontierof criminalrewards-crimerisks offersa crime option that is
superiorto his legitimatejob alternatives.
The statistical
testspresentedin thispaperconsequentlyhave a twofold
purpose.First,by focusingon the relationbetweencrimeincome and
crime risks for individual criminal behavior, I avoid the types of
shortcomings
associatedwithinvestigations
crimestatistics.
of aggregative
Second,obtainingdirectestimatesof thedollarpremiumsforcrimerisks
providesan alternativeand more comprehensivetype of test for the
effectiveness
of criminal deterrencemeasures. If this analysis yields
similarresults,one's confidencein the earlierresearchfindingsshould
be bolstered.
Section II provides an overview of the research approach and a
descriptionof the NBER minorityyouthsample thatwas used forthis
study.This surveyincludesdetailedinformation
crime
on self-reported
incomeand criminalenforcement
risks,makingit possible to make the
directlinkage requiredfor a risk premiumanalysis.In Section III, I
analyzethe respondents'perceptionsof variousrisksof criminalactivity
and the relationof these risks to overall income levels for crimesof
different
estimates
types.SectionIV presentsthecompensating
differential
forboth monthlyand yearlycriminalbehavior.As predicted,especially
hazardous formsof criminalendeavorcommand compensatingdifferentialsnot unlikethoseforriskylegitimatepursuits.
II. Research Approach and Description of the Sample
A. ConceptualFramework
The relation between the compensatingdifferentialresearch and
analysesof criminalbehaviorcan bestbe illustratedby consideringtheir
similarconceptual foundations.Although there is not a demand for
crimeper se, individualsdo createan implicitdemandforcrimethrough
theiractions. A decision to purchase a more expensivecar raises the
potentialrewardsto a car thief,but the installationof a burglaralarm
or an ignitioncutoffdevicereducesthe probabilityof incurringa crimerelatedloss.
Such individualconsumptiondecisions,includingthoserelatedto selfprotection,generatea set of criminal opportunities.The protective
individualactionsin conjunctionwithcriminalenforcement
efforts
lead
to a risk p associated with the potential crime income, where for
simplicityone mightview this risk as the chance of apprehensionand
conviction.In practice,thereare multiplerisks,such as arrestwithout
conviction,arrestwith conviction,prisontermsof differing
length,and
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different
The risk-rewards
probation
conditions.
frontier
ofsuchopporis all thatis relevant
tunities
since,forcrimeswithan identical
riskiness,
themorelucrative
willdominate
ventures
thosewitha lowerpayoff.

Two such frontiersare Y1(p) and Y2(p), shown in figure1. These
curveshave been drawn as beingupwardslopingfortwo reasons.First,
the potentialfor greaterpotentiallosses fromcrime will increasethe
desire to diminishthese throughvarious kinds of protectiveactions,
which in turn will increase the risk p.3 For similar reasons, police
protectionin more affluentareas should be greaterto the extentthat
this is the collectivemechanismfor reflectingthe greaterdemand for
self-protection.
Second,if thereare any dips or flatspots in the frontier,
theywill not be relevantto individualchoice since, as will be shown
below, criminalswill choose to be on only upward-slopingportions
of Y(p).
Indifference
curvesforthreerepresentative
individualsare also sketched
in figure1. These curves are upward sloping since individualswill
necessarilydemand a compensatingdifferential
forincreasesin the risk
of crimeso long as apprehensionand convictionis less attractive
thana
successfulcriminalendeavor.
The natureof the choice problemis reflectedin the followingsimple
model. Let there be two states, state 1, in which the individual is
successfulwith the crime,and state2, in which he is not. The utilityof
incomex is givenby U1(x) and U2(x),respectively,
where
Ul(X) >

U2(X);

Ux, U2 >

?;

Uxx

U2x

< ?.

For any given income level, the individual would preferto be
successfulat crimebecause of the unattractiveness
of beingincarcerated.
Even if criminalsuccess did not affectone's income level, individuals
would desirea compensatingdifferential
forcrimerisks.
These effectsare bolsteredwhen one takes into account the financial
loss. Criminal success leads to a crime income Y(p) plus outside
legitimateincome W, whereasfailureleads to incomeZ, where
W + Y(p)> Z.
The choice problemforthe potentialcriminalis to selecthis optimal
crimerisklevel or to
max V = (1 - p)U1[Y(p) + W] + pU2(Z),
Suchstatements
classof crimesand selfassumea relatively
homogeneous
less
protection
relations.
Some goods maybe valuablebut can be protected
thanothers.
effectively
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FIG. 1.-The

income
marketforillegitimate

whichleads to the requirement
dY

dp

U[ - U2

(1 - p)Ux

will alwaysbe on the upward-sloping
Acceptablecrimeopportunities
portion of the criminalopportunitiescurve. Any observed criminal
behaviorarisingas a consequenceof thismarketforillegitimateincome
In thecase of theopportunities
will involveriskpremiums.4
consequently
will be A fora person
combination
curveY2(p),theoptimalrisk-rewards
preferences
with
person
for
a
withpreferences
Ua and B
Ub. While these
attainablefrom
levels
welfare
highest
the
curvesrepresent
indifference
desirablethey
to
be
options
availablecriminalopportunities,
for these
'This resultgeneralizesto other situationssuch as time allocation models.
AppendixA in Viscusi(1979) presentsa timeallocationmodel forjob risksthat
has manyparallelswiththe model of riskycriminalchoices.
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mustoffergreaterrewardsthanlegitimatejob alternatives.5
Competition
among criminalswill drive down any rentsfromcriminalactivityso
thattherewill be no financialincentiveforcriminalsto enterparticular
lines of criminalpursuitwhen the marketforillegitimateincome is in
equilibrium.
The focusof the compensatingcrimeriskdifferential
analysisin this
paperis to estimatethe path tracedout by pointssuch as A and B.6 The
observedlocus of crimeincome-riskcombinationswill have a positive
slope if thereare compensatingdifferentials
forcrimerisks.The testof
thevalidityof thecriminaldeterrence
hypothesisconsequentlyis whether
crimeincomeis positivelyrelatedto theperceivedriskof crime.If there
is no deterrenceeffect,points such as A and B should lie along a
horizontalline.
The traditionalfocusin the literature
has been quite different.
Rather
than estimatethe slopes of such curvesdirectly,the emphasishas been
on factorsinfluencing
crimerates.In particular,what is the probability
thatthe individualwill choose the no crimecornersolutionratherthan
a point along the crimeincome schedule Y1(p) or Y2(p)?As the crime
opportunitiescurve shiftsupward, more individualsshould choose to
engagein crimebecause the relativerewardsfromcriminalactivityhave
risen. The underlyingreasoningis the same as in the compensating
differential
approach,exceptthatthe focusis on discretechoices rather
thanthe slope of the frontier.
The empiricalapproach in the deterrenceliteraturehas been more
narrow,however,as crime participationis related only to variables
pertainingto thecrimerisk,such as arrestratesforcrime,thusexcluding
crimeincome as an explicitconcern.This approach will be correctif
in crime
one is analyzingsituationsin which thereare no differences
income levels. In effectthe value along the verticalaxis in figure1 is
assumed to be constantso that crime participationin the stringent
enforcement
regionY1(p),whichimposesa greaterriskper unitof crime
income earned,will be less than in the weaker enforcement
situation

forY2(p).

Such equalityof crimeincome levels need not prevail,however.The
stringent
enforcement
regionmay be coupled with extraordinarily
high
criminal rewards, making crime more attractivethan in the weak
enforcement
area. Such a patternis particularly
likelyto be the case to
the extentthatareas withgreatercrimeincomeopportunities
(e.g., more
affluent
areas) opt forgreaterlevelsof police protection.Given the very
close interrelation
betweenthe potentialfinancialgains fromcrimeand
5If thereare individuals
who chooseto engagein crimesat verylow risks,
thentheeconomicreturns
fromcrimewillapproachthosefroma legitimate
job
as theriskbecomesincreasingly
small.
6 For two earlyformal
treatments
of the hedonicapproachunderlying
this
paper,seeRosen(1974)andThalerandRosen(1976).
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both the incentiveto commitcrimeand society'sdesireto protectsuch
it is clearlynot
losses fromoccurringthroughcriminalenforcement,
ideal to examine only variationsin crime risk and their relation to
crimerates.
To theextentthattheeconomicincentivesto commitcrimehave been
analyzedin past analysesit has been throughthe inclusionof variables
such as the area's povertyrate or the unemploymentrate, but these
measuresare directedmore at the potentialcriminal'slegitimateopportunitiesthan at the income crime mightgenerate.By undertakingan
analysisthat includes both the positive and the negativefeaturesof
criminalbehavior,we can obtainresultsthatgiveus a morecomprehensive
perspectiveon the factorsthatinfluencecriminalbehavior.
B. Descriptionof the Sample
The sample I will use is the NBER Surveyof Inner City Black Male
Employment.This survey,which was undertakenin 1979-80, provides
detailedinformation
and activitiesof a sample of
on the characteristics
2,358inner-city
minority
youthsfromBoston,Chicago,and Philadelphia.
The age span includedin the surveywas 15-24, which is a high crime
group that accounts for 60% of all criminalarrests.7Moreover,black
shareof thesearrests,so thatthe
youthsaccountfora disproportionate
surveyaddressesa major segmentof the overallcriminalpopulation.
In addition to including the usual survey questions on personal
characteristicsand legitimateactivities,the NBER survey included
questionson the individual'scriminalactivity,his income fromcrime,
and the perceivedrisksfromcriminalactivity.Their self-reported
crime
activityvariableswill be the focus of the empiricalanalysis since, in
termsoftheanalysispresentedearlier,theyprovideinformation
pertinent
to both dimensionsof the diagramsketchedin figure1.
variables are potentiallythe most reliable sources of
Self-reported
on the individual'sassessmentof the risksof crimeand its
information
rewards.Unfortunately,
the sensitivityof these questions may lead
This
respondentsto understatethe extentof theircriminalinvolvement.
underreporting
problemis particularlysevereforblack sample populations,such as theone in theNBER sample.8As a result,I have estimated
thatthe annual crimerate for the sample may be more than twice as
large as the 19% rate of crime that the respondentsreportedfor the
past year.9
7The crimestatistics
citedin thisparagraphpertainto 1981.

reviewof thisevidence,see Hindelang,Hirschi,and Weis (1981).
In Viscusi(1986), I presentseveralestimateson the extentof the reporting
bias using the Hindelang et al. (1981) self-reporting
bias estimates,data on
juveniledelinquency,and consistencyof the reportedcrimeratesin the sample
and theirratesof past imprisonment.
All threeapproachesyielded bias factor
estimatesin the rangeof 2-4.
8 For a

9
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Althoughunderstatements
of criminalbehaviormay createpotential
problemsfortheempiricalanalysis,the studyby Hindelanget al. (1981)
suggeststhatthe underreporting
primarilyaffectsthe interceptsof the
regressionequations;the coefficients
are not distortedprovidedthatthe
regressionfocuseson within-groupbehavior.The NBER sample only
includesinformation
on black youths,so the biases thatarisein acrossgroup comparisonswill not enter.Since the Hindelang et al. study's
focus on juvenile delinquencyclosely parallels the emphasis of the
NBER survey,the findingsof thatstudyare closelyrelatedto the likely
characteristics
of the NBER sample.
Table 1 provides a glossaryof the variables,and table 2 lists the
samplemeansand standarddeviationsforthe fullsample,forthosewho
committedcrimein thepast month,and forthosewho engagedin crime
duringthe past year. The personal characteristics
variables that play
such an instrumental
role in analysesof legitimateearningsdisplaylittle
variationacrossone's criminalstatus.Age, education,and maritalstatus
levels are similarfor all threesample groups.Since thereis verylittle
variationin these variables,the differences
that mightbe evidentin a
surveyof a broaderpopulationgroup are not apparent.Participationin
crimeis stronglyrelatedto personalcharacteristics
such as whetherone
drinks,takesdrugs,or smokesmarijuana.Churchattendanceis negatively
relatedto criminalbehavior.
The majorityof the samplewas eitheremployedor attendingschool,
with one-thirdof all respondentsin neitherof thesecategories.For the
criminalsubsamples,the degree of idleness is particularlygreat, as
roughlyhalfthosewho commitcrimeare not employedor in school.
The NBER surveyincludedseveralcrime-related
backgroundquestions.
During the past 13 months,the timespenton probation(PROBT) or in
jail (JAILT) was small for the entiresample but much largerfor the
criminalpopulation.Membershipin a gang or havingfriendsin a gang
(GANG) was positivelyrelated to criminalinvolvement,as was the
perceivedexistenceof a problemof crimein the neighborhood.
The firstof the criminalactivityvariablesis CHANCE, which is the
numberof opportunitiesto make money illegallythat the respondent
encountersper week. Based on the performance
of thisvariable,which
is reportedin Viscusi (1986), CHANCE servesprimarilyas a measure
of theintensity
of criminalactivity.Those who engagedin crimeduring
thepast monthhave an averageof 1.4 such illegalearningsopportunities
weekly,as comparedwith .71 optionsforthe entiresample.The crime
participationdummyvariables(CRIME-MO and CRIME-YR) will not
explicitlyenter the empiricalanalysis but will serve as the primary
variablesforstratifying
the monthlyand yearlycrimesubsamples.
The primaryfocus of the empiricalanalysiswill be on the level of
crimeincome duringthe past month(CRIMEY-MO) and duringthe
past year(CRIMEY-YR). Althoughreportedcrimeincomeaccountsfor
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Table 1
Glossaryof Variables
AGE = Age in years
EDUCATION = Years of schooling
MARRIED = Maritalstatusdummyvariable(d.v.); MARRIED = 1 if respondentis
married,0 otherwise
DRINK = Drinkingd.v.; DRINK = 1 if respondenteverdrinksbeer,wine,or
hardliquor,0 otherwise
DRUGS = Drugs d.v.; DRUGS = 1 if respondenteveruses drugssuch as
cocaine,heroin,barbituates,
amphetamines,
or LSD; 0 otherwise
uses marijuana,0
POT = Marijuanad.v.; POT = 1 if respondentcurrently
otherwise
RELIGION = Religiond.v.; RELIGION = 1 if respondentattendsservicesat least
once a month,0 otherwise
JOB = Employedd.v.;JOB = 1 if respondentwas workingmostof the last
week 0 otherwise
SCHOOL = School d.v.; SCHOOL = 1 if respondentwas goingto school mostof
the last week,0 otherwise
PROBT = Numberof monthson probationduringthe timeline period
JAILT = Numberof monthsin jail duringthe timeline period
GANG = Gang membershipd v.; GANG = 1 if respondentwas a memberof a
gang or had friendsin a fang, 0 otherwise
CNBD = Crime in neighborhoodd.v.; CNBD = 1 if respondentbelievedthatit
was truethatcrimeand violencein the neighborhoodwas a serious
problem,0 otherwise
CHANCE = Numberof chancesrespondenthas to make moneyillegallyper week
CRIME-MO = Crime d.v.; CRIME-MO = 1 if respondentcommittedcriminalacts in
last fourweeks,0 otherwise
CRIMEY-MO = Crime incomein the past month
CRIME-YR = Crime d.v.; CRIME-YR = 1 if respondentcommittedcriminalacts in
last year,0 otherwise
CRIMEY-YR = Crime incomein the past year
ARREST-HI = Respondentassesseschance of gettingarrestedas beinghigh;0-1 d.v.
forperceivedrisks
ARREST-LO = Respondentassesseschance of gettingarrestedas beinglow; 0-1 d.v.
CONVICT-HI = Respondentassesseschance of gettingconvicted(conditionalon
arrest)as beinghigh;0-1 d.v.
CONVICT-LO = Respondentassesseschance of gettingconvicted(conditionalon
arrest)as beinglow; 0-1 d.v.
PRISON-HI = Respondentassesseschance of goingto prison(conditionalon
conviction)as beinghigh;0-1 d.v.
PRISON-LO = Respondentassesseschance of goingto prison(conditionalon
conviction)as beinglow; 0-1 d.v.
ARREST = Weightedarrestrisk;high = .75, medium= .5, and low = .25
CONVICT = Weightedconvicitionrisk;high = .75, medium= .5, and low = .25
PRISON = Weightedprisonrisk;high = .75, medium= .5, and low = .25
LOW = Chance of arrest,conviction,and prisonare all low; 0-1 d.v.
RISK = Overall crimerisk;ARREST X CONVICT X PRISON
BOS = Regionald.v.; BOS = 1 if respondentlivesin Boston,0 otherwise
CHI = Regionald.v.; CHI = 1 if respondentlivesin Chicago, 0 otherwise
PHILA = Regionald.v.; PHILA = 1 if respondentlivesin Philadelphia,0
otherwise

under 10% of the sample's total income,for those who commitcrime
illegalincomeis relatively
large-$272 monthlyforthosewho committed
crimein the past monthand $1,504 annuallyforthose who committed
crime in the past year. To put these amounts in perspective,it is

Table 2
Sample Characteristics:Means and Standard Deviations

Variable
characteristics:
Personal
AGE
EDUCATION
MARRIED*
DRINK*
DRUGS*
POT*
RELIGION*
status:
LABOR market
JOB*
SCHOOL*
Crime-related
background:
PROBT
JAILT
GANG*
CNBD*
Criminal
activity:
CHANCE
($)*
CRIME-MO(month)
CRIMEY-MO
CRIME-YR(year)($)*
CRIMEY-YR
enforcement:
Criminal
ARREST-HI
ARREST-LO
CONVICT-HI
CONVICT-LO
PRISON-HI
PRISON-LO
ARREST
CONVICT
PRISON
LOW
RISK
Location:
BOS*
CHI*
PHILA*
Samplesize

Full
Sample

Crimein
Last
Month

Crimein
LastYear

19.1
(2.6)
10.8
(1.6)
.036
.59
.03
.36
.33

19.8
(2.6)
10.8
(1.4)
.043
.82
.16
.71
.22

19.6
(2.6)
10.6
(1.4)
.043
.82
.14
.68
.23

.26
.40

.24
.22

.25
.25

.04
(2.0)
.01
(.84)
.08
.39

1.5
(3.4)
.03
(1.5)
.17
.52

1.4
(3.4)
.03
(1.4)
.16
.52

.71
(1.15)
.15
40.28
(439.71)
.19
279.99
(1,325.98)
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
.32
.34
.34
2,358

1.39
(1.34)
1.0
272.15
(520.90)
.77
1,688.41
(3,689.57)
.058t
.734t
.074t
.791t
.142t
.710t
.332t
.321t
.358t
.583t
.052t
.30
.29
.41
349

deviations
areinparentheses.
N.A. = notapplicable.
NOTE.-Standard

1.36
(1.35)
.97
213.65
(477.91)
1.0
1,503.92
(3,370.69)
N.A4
N.A.t
N.A.t
N.A.t
N.A.t
N.A4
.463t
.4274
.470t
.4124
.188t
.32
.28
.40
439

*Standard
from
their
canbecalculated
deviations
of0-1dummy
areomitted
sincethey
variables
is(m- mr2)05.
deviation
fraction
where
thestandard
minthesample,
t Perceived.
: Constructed.

Criminal
Deterrence

327

noteworthy
thattheaveragelegalincomelevelforthesamplewas just

over $2,800.
The next set of variablespertainedto the perceivedrisksof criminal
enforcement.
This set of questionswas only administered
to respondents
who had engagedin criminalactivityin the past month.The principal
questionsconcernedwhetherat the time he committedhis crimesthe
respondentbelievedthe riskof arrest,the riskof convictionconditional
on arrest,and the risk of prison conditionalon convictionwere high,
medium("about 50-50"), or low.
For the monthlycriminalsubsample,the respondents'answerswere
used to createa seriesof perceivedcrimeriskvariables.The firstset of
variablespertainedto whetherthe respondentbelievedthatthe risksof
arrest(ARREST-LO), conviction(CONVICT-LO), and prison(PRISONLO) were low. In each case, about three-fourths
of the sample assessed
therisksas beinglow. The high-risk
response(ARREST-HI, CONVICTHI, and PRISON-HI) will not be used in the empiricalanalysisbut are
reportedhere to provide a broaderperspectiveon the responses.The
highriskstendto increasesomewhatas one movesthroughthe criminal
justicesystem,reachinga peak of .14 forthe riskof prisonconditional
on conviction.

The next group of variables representedscaled versions of these
dummyvariableswhere a mediumriskreceiveda value of .5, which is
tantamountto the "about 50-50" wording of the questionnaire.The
low-riskresponsereceiveda value at the midpointof the lower range,
.25, while the high-riskresponsesreceiveda value of .75. All the scaled
ARREST, CONVICT, and PRISON variableshad comparablevalues
that ranged from .32 to .36. These three variables were all highly
interrelated,
withsimplecorrelationcoefficients
around .85.
Two variableswere createdto reflectthe entiresequence of risksthe
individualfaced.The firstof theseis LOW, which is a dummyvariable
that takes on a value of one only if the respondentbelieves that the
risksof arrest,prison,and convictionare all low; thatis, it is theproduct
of ARREST-LO, CONVICT-LO, and PRISON-LO. Somewhatstrikof thesampleassessedall thesecriminalenforceingly,aboutthree-fifths
mentrisksas being low. The second variable,RISK, is the productof
ARREST, CONVICT, and PRISON. If one were to treatthe scalingof
the componentvariablesas being meaningfulin probabilisticterms,the
overallrisk of being caught and ultimatelyconvictedis about .05. (In
reality,the riskis much lower since the scalingof low riskas being .25
overstatestheserisklevels.)When comparedwiththe component-scaled
risk variables,RISK is only one-sixththe size of these values, which
suggeststhatthesuccessionof risksthatone mustfacebeforebeingsent
to prison gives a criminala fairlygood chance of escaping criminal
punishmentat some juncture.
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Althoughcomparableperceivedrisk data were not available for the
yearlycriminalresponses,a lengthycomputeralgorithmutilized the
monthlydata to constructobjectiverisk measuresfor each individual.
The crime risk responseswere matched to the particularcrimes the
individualcommittedin the past month,weightedon a proportional
basis in the case of multiplecriminalpursuits.The linkagebetweenthe
monthlyand the yearlycrimeresponseswas this crimerisk X activity
variable.The risk assignedto the individual'sannual criminalactivities
correspondedto the risks associatedwith the crimeshe committedin
the past year,wherein the case of multiplecriminalpursuitsthe crimes
were weightedproportionally.
The constructedriskconsequentlyis the
overallriskposed by the individual'scriminalpursuits.
Unlike the perceivedrisks,this variableis not affectedby individual
differences
in thresholdsregardingwhat,forexample,constitutesa high
risk.This greaterobjectivityis a positivefeature,and, as a result,both
objective risk variables and perceived risk variables will be used in
analyzingthe monthlycrimedata. The perceivedriskvariablesofferthe
offsetting
advantagethattheymay betterreflectthe risksposed by the
individual's particularcrimes and his manner of committingthem.
Neithervariableis clearlypreferableon a priorigrounds.
Finally,a seriesof dummyvariablesfordifferent
locationswas created.
The respondentswere roughlyevenlydistributed
acrossthe threesurvey
sites.All those interviewedwere black inner-city
youths,whose general
attachment
to the legitimatelabor marketis quite low.
III. Risks and Rewards of Criminal Activity
When individualscommita crime,theyincura sequence of criminal
enforcementlotteries.Before an individualcan be sent to prison,he
mustfirstbe arrestedand convicted.Althoughimprisonment
is not the
of crime(e.g., establishing
only sanctionthat affectsthe undesirability
an arrestrecordmay also be unattractive),
it is instructiveto examine
the sequence of linksin the criminalenforcement
system.
Figure2 sketchesthe sequenceof lotteriesand the averagefrequencies
associatedwitheach componentlottery.Unless theindividualis arrested,
thereis no possibilityof an actualloss imposedby criminalenforcement
measures.About three-fourths
of those committingcrimeview the risk
of arrestas being low, which is consistentwith prevailingviews that
fewcriminalsare evercaught.The conditionalrisksof convictionclosely
parallel the arrestperceptions.Almost all those who assess the arrest
risks as being low believe that if they are arrestedthe chance of
convictionis low. Those assessingthe arrestrisk as being mediumalso
tend to believe that the risk of convictionis medium. Finally,those
assessingarrestrisksas beinghightendto view convictionrisksas being
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a substantial
low.In thecaseofmediumandhigharrest
risks,however,
portionviewtheconviction
riskas beinglow, so thatthereis a large
potential
forescapingpunishment
in thesecondstageof thecriminal
system.
justice
small
The finalset of lotteries
on imprisonment
involvesrelatively
samples,particularly
fortheupperportionof thechanceforkdiagram,
sincemostrespondents
wentdowntheinitiallow-arrest-risk
path.It is
noteworthy
thattheprospects
forultimately
escapingcriminal
sanctions
arequitehighsinceat leastone of thethreesequential
risksis usually
low. Mostrespondents
who assessedthearrestriskas beinghigh,for
example,
viewedthechanceofimprisonment
conditional
on conviction
as beinglow.
The samegeneralpattern
displayed
by thearrestand conviction
risks
also holdsforrisksof imprisonment
sincethereis a strongcorrelation
amongthe variousrisks.The positivecorrelation
amongthe various
risksis notunexpected.
Theserisksarebasedon thetypesofcrimesthe
individual
commits.
Gambling,
forexample,is likelyto be a low-risk
crimecomparedwitharmedrobbery,
of whetherone is
irrespective
considering
the riskof arrest,the riskof conviction,
or the riskof
prison.The emphasesof the different
phasesof the criminaljustice
systemshouldall reflectsociety'sassessment
of the severity
of the
offense.
Otherfactorsmayalso enter,such as the ease of identifying
crimesthathave been committed.
"Victimless"
crimessuch as drug
dealingare rarelyreported,whereasmuggingsare reasonablywell
reported,
so thatarrestratesforreported
crimesmaynotalwaysreflect
thelikelyconsequences
shouldhe be caught.As a
facingtheindividual
broadgeneralization,
however,
thepositivecorrelation
of thedifferent
criminal
sanctionrisksappearsto be an accuratereflection
oftheactual
enforcement
process.
in the case of biased
Individualperceptions
also enter,particularly
beliefs.
Thosewhosystematically
underestimate
arrest
risksarelikelyto
thuscompounding
underassess
therisksofconviction
andimprisonment,
theirerrors.The constructed
riskvariablesbasedon averageperceived
risksacrosscrimecategories
areintended
to alleviatethisdifficulty.
is reflected
The extentto whichperceived
risksvarybycrimecategory
inthebreakdowns
intable3. Therespondents
which
indicated
presented
of 10 different
crimestheycommitted:
numbersand illegalgambling,
sellingand fencingstolengoods, sellingmarijuanaor otherdrugs,
or
and larceny,muggings
and pursesnatchings,
burglary
shoplifting
theft
fromcars,cashingor forging
stolenchecks,con gamesandfrauds,
robberies
and holdups,and otherillegalactivities.
The averagenumber
of crimecategories
in whichcriminals
was 1.6.In thecase
participated
of multiple
therisksassociatedwiththecrimeswere
criminal
pursuits
weighted
proportionally.
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There is considerabledisparityin the crimerisksassociatedwith the
different
typesof crime.Shopliftingis a relativelysafe crime,as few of
the respondentsbelievedthatthe riskof arrestor convictionwas high,
and the overallRISK level is at its lowest value. This crimesdoes tend
to pose moremediumrisksthan do othercategoriesso thatthe overall
value of the LOW variableis not as greatas forsome othercategories.
The most frequentlycommittedcrime category,numbersand illegal
gambling,also is quite safe both in termsof the scaled RISK variable
and in termsof the degreeto which all the threesequentialcrimerisks
assume a low value (i.e., LOW). This patternaccords with the actual
risksfromgamblingsince thisactivityis seldom reportedto police.
At the high end of the criminalrisk spectrumare predatorycrimes
such as burglary.The prison linkage conditional on conviction is
especiallystrong,as the risks rise steadilyas one moves throughthe
criminaljusticesystem.
Chief among the crimesposing an intermediate
risk is drug dealing,
which is the second most prevalentcrimecategory.Unlike crimessuch
as con games and burglary,the riskof suffering
punishmentforselling
drugsdoes not escalateas one passes throughthesuccessivestepstoward
conviction.Many respondentsbelievethatthe chance of arrestfor this
crimeis quite low, which is what one would expectsince thereis little
incentiveforthe purchasersof drugsto reportthe sellersto the police.
Table 4 summarizesthe fractionof the criminalsubsamples who
commiteach particular
groupof crimesand theaverageincomeassociated
with each crime class.'0 The two principalsources of reportedcrime
income are gambling and drug dealing. This ranking parallels the
assessmentsby the U.S. InternalRevenue Service,which estimatesthat
90% of all illegalincomecomes fromdrugdealingand variousformsof
illegal gambling."
Althoughnumbersand illegalgamblingare the mostprevalentcrimes,
as two-thirdsof all criminalsengagein such pursuits,the averagecrime
income yieldedby this activityis near the middle of the crimeincome
spectrum.Numbers and gamblingare quite attractive,however,since
the riskassociatedwiththesecrimesis not great.
Drug dealing is also quite widespread,with one-thirdof the sample
The rewardsfromsellingdrugsare among the
engagingin such efforts.
highestfor all crimecategories.Anotherchiefsource of illegal income
is fencingstolen goods, which is the third most prevalentcriminal
pursuitand one of the mostfinanciallyrewarding.
10In thecase of multiplecrimecategories,
theincomewas dividedproportionally
amongthe crimecategories.
11 This estimatewas preparedby the U.S. InternalRevenue Service for the
U.S. Departmentof Treasury,the Council of Economic Advisers,and the U.S.
Officeof Managementand Budget(see U.S. InternalRevenueService1980).
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Table 4
and IncomeLevel byCrimeCategory
CrimeParticipation
Monthly
Criminal
Behavior
Category
Numbers
Fenced
Drugdealer
Burglary
Mugging
Shoplifting
Forgery
Con games
Robbery
Othercrimes

YearlyCriminal
Behavior

Fraction
Who
Commit

Average
CrimeIncome($)

Fraction
Who
Commit

.668
.166
.324
.054
.023
.089
.020
.160
.043
.046

103.01
191.78
189.42
134.56
94.61
149.03
120.95
133.84
242.78
443.51

.631
.185
.371
.114
.132
.034
.068
.030
.159
.066

Average
CrimeIncome($)
565.14
720.85
994.54
760.78
744.36
373.17
891.48
337.67
624.39
1,928.98

By far the most lucrative crime category is the residual "any other
illegal activities" grouping, which captures not only the illegal effort
categories that were not listed but also the crimes committed by
individuals who were reluctantto reveal the nature of their crimes. Since
the average crime income in the other crime activity group is double
that of the second highest category, this group includes many of the
most financiallysuccessful criminals. The risks associated with the other
crime category are not particularly large (see table 3), so that the level
of rewards does not appear to represent a compensating differentialper
se. These overall relations do not, however, take into account the
intensity of the criminal activity or other variables that influence the
risk-rewardstrade-off.
IV. Estimates of Compensating

Differentials

The structureof the equations used to estimate the relation between
crime income and the associated risks was dictated in part by the nature
of the survey. Respondents who did not engage in crime in the past
month or the past year were not included in the estimation since these
individuals were not asked the crime risk questions; nor was there any
crime activity information that could be used to construct such a risk
measure.
For the criminal group subsamples it was possible to construct a series
of crime risk variables. As discussed above, those who engaged in crime
during the past month gave self-assessed crime risk responses that were
used to construct eight perceived crime risk variables. For the four
perceived crime risk variables that represented continuous crime risk
levels (i.e., ARREST, CONVICT, PRISON, and RISK) rather than 0-1
dummy variables, I constructed risk variables for specific crimes that
were then matched to the self-reportedcrimes to obtain a constructed
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riskmeasureforboth the monthlyand the yearlycriminalsubsamples.
In all, therewere twelvecrimeriskvariablesforthe monthysubsample
and fourcrimeriskvariablesforthe yearlysubsample.
The failureto obtaincrimeriskassessmentsfromnoncriminalgroups
is not ideal sinceit would be instructive
to analyzehow riskperceptions
alter crime participationdecisions. Even with such informationwe
would stilllack an observablenonzerocrimeincomelevelforthosewho
do not commitcrime.All thatwe know is thatthe crimeincome level
they perceivedto be available was below the level they required to
engagein crime.The observedcrimeincometrade-off
will consequently
understatethe premiumper unit risk requiredby those who do not
engage in crime." The analysisbelow consequentlyaddressesonly the
observedratesof trade-off
one can reap throughactualcriminalbehavior,
which
thatis, the economicstructureof currentcriminalopportunities,
is what is pertinentto estimationof the crime income-risktrade-off
schedule in figure 1. The estimatespertain to the rates of trade-off
between crime income and crime risk for those who commit crime,
whichwill be different
fromthe trade-offs
of noncriminals.
Each crime income equation included a group of human capital
variables(AGE, EDUCATION, and MARRIED) thatwere not statistically significantand a set of personal attributesand regionalvariables
(DRINK, DRUGS, POT, RELIGION, PROBT, JAILT,JOB, SCHOOL,
CHANCE, GANG, CNBD, CHI, and BOS). The relation of these
variables to criminal behavior follows the expected patternsand is
exploredin detailin Viscusi (1986). As a result,I will focushereon the
crimerisk coefficients,
where in each case a single crimerisk variable
enteredthe equation.
From a conceptualstandpoint,all threerisk types should influence
criminal behavior. To the extent that imprisonmentis a pertinent
negativepayoffof crime,all threecriminalenforcement
risksmustturn
out unfavorably
forthiseventto occur.Convictionwithoutimprisonment
also will impose a loss on the criminal,as may an arrestwithout
convictionto the extentthat it affectsone's police record. Similarly,
otherenforcement-related
outcomessuch as probationwill influencethe
of criminalbehavior.Exploratoryregressionsincludingtwo
desirability
or more crimemeasuresdid not yield crimerisk coefficients
thatwere
significanton an individualbasis. Because of the stronginterrelation
among the probabilisticbeliefsconcerningthe risk assessments,it was
not feasibleto estimatereliablymore than a single crimerisk variable
12 A comparableself-selection
problemarisesin thejob riskliterature,
as noted
in Thalerand Rosen's (1976) studyof high-risk
jobs. In Viscusi(1983) I estimate
the degree of heterogeneityin risk preference.Because the regressionsare
necessarily
conditionalon crimeparticipation
becauseof thenatureof thesurvey,
inclusionofa selectivity
variableforwhetherone engagesin crimeis inappropriate.
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in each equation.Similardifficulties
oftenarisewithrespectto compensatingdifferentials
forjob risksas mostanalysesfocuson eithernonfatal
or fatal risks because of the difficulties
encounteredwhen both risk
discussed
variablesappear in the equation. The crime risk coefficients
below consequentlyare each based on otherwiseidenticalequationsthat
differonly in termsof the riskvariablethatwas included.
Table 5 summarizesthe estimatesforthe crimeriskvariablesand the
associated risk premiumsimplied by the coefficients.The standard
deviationsfortheserisk premiumsin the finalcolumn were computed
fromestimatesof the riskpremiumsfor each individualin the sample.
This statisticconsequentlyis intended to reflectthe range in risk
premiumsinduced by the differences
in risk levels across the sample
Table 5
Criminal EnforcementRisk Regression Results
Coefficients*
Perceivedrisks(monthly):
ARREST-LO
CONVICT-LO
PRISON-LO
LOW
ARREST
CONVICT
PRISON
RISK
Constructedrisks(monthly):
ARREST

Risk Premiums($)t

-.526
(.146)
-.446
(.162)
-.574
(.151)
-.564
(.136)
1.584
(.450)
1.046
(.446)
1.211
(.377)
2.535
(.850)

30.25
(527.00)
20.58
(524.02)
34.74
(533.82)
49.40
(531.69)
107.59
(523.88)
75.58
(522.53)
92.02
(528.29)
30.05
(525.39)

2.228
(.378)
2.698
(.475)
3.060
(.504)
.981
(.300)

157.67
(532.60)
169.57
(530.61)
192.74
(529.43)
23.95
(531.94)

1.663
(.313)
1.973
(.389)
1.980
(.422)
.637
(.175)

757.38
(3,430.63)
812.42
(3,422.63)
874.09
(3,416.95)
31.37
(3,424.37)

CONVICT
PRISON
RISK
Constructedrisks(yearly):
ARREST
CONVICT
PRISON
RISK
* Standard
errors
areinparentheses.
deviations
areinparentheses.
t Standard
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ratherthantheprecisionof thecrimeriskcoefficient
which
estimates,
in thecoefficients
is reflected
column.
(standard
errors)
For boththemonthly
and theyearlycrimeincomeequationsthereis
consistently
strongevidenceof premiumsfor the risksof criminal
In thecase of monthly
thescaledperceived
activity.
criminal
behavior,
riskvariables(i.e., ARREST, CONVICT, PRISON, and RISK) as a
groupperform
much betterthan the dummyvariables.The effects
in thelow-risk
reflected
dummy
variables
areroughly
one-third
ofthose
reflect
differences
impliedbytheirscaledriskcounterparts,
whichbetter
in thedegreeofrisk.
is
The scaledriskvariablethatdoesnotperform
particularly
strongly
theRISK variable,
Thesepatterns
whichhasa comparatively
smalleffect.
in theRISK effects
throughout
theempirical
resultssuggestthatit may
notbe theentiresequenceof risksleadingto imprisonment
thatis of
concernsincetheoddsofexperiencing
thisadverseoutcome
paramount
are not great.Ratherthe entireset of intermediate
outcomes(arrest,
conviction,
probation,
etc.)maybe instrumental.
risk
The monthly
crimeincomeestimates
obtainedusingconstructed
risk
measures
suggest
muchlargerriskpremiums
thandid theperceived
findings.
Althoughthe perceivedriskvariablemaybettercapturethe
riskmayserveas a better
objective
person-specific
risks,theconstructed
in what
measureof the crimerisk insofaras individualdifferences
constitutes
a highor a low riskdo not enter.For thethreeprincipal
scaledriskvariables,
theaverageriskpremium
impliedbytheperceived
riskvariablesis $92 or 34% of monthlycrimeincome,whereasthe
monthly
riskpremium
impliedby theconstructed
risksis $173or 64%
of all crimeincome.In each case thereis clear-cutevidenceof risk
premiums,
implyingthat the crimeincome-risk
profileis upward
sloping.
The yearlycrimeincomeresultsalso lend supportto the criminal
deterrence
The spiritof the resultsis verysimilarto the
hypothesis.
monthly
findings,
withcrimeriskpremiums
averaging
$815 or 54% of
totalcrimeincome.The crimeriskshareis somewhat
lessfortheyearly
crimeincomesincetherespondents
crimesin thepast
who committed
monthengagein criminalactivity
on a moreintensive
basis.Bothin
termsof thelevelsof crimeincomeper unittimeand thenumberof
crimescommitted,
thosewho engagedin criminalactivity
duringthe
past monthhave stronger
criminalinclinations
thanthosewho only
committed
crimesat somepointin thepastyear.The risksposed by
committing
any particular
crimecategoryconsequently
maybe a bit
largerto theextentthattheCHANCE and othervariables
do notfully
reflect
crime
the greaterintensity
of criminalactivity
of the monthly
participants.

The constructed
crimeriskresultsimplycrimeriskpremiums
on the
orderof 54%-64%of all crimeincome.These resultsrepresent
much
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effects
forthehealthandsafety
stronger
risks
thando theriskpremiums
roleplayedby crimerisk
of jobs,whichaverage6%./13The dominant
is notinconsistent
results
premiums
withthestrong
empirical
concerning
ofcriminal
enforcement
in crime.In addition,
theeffect
on participation
criminal
a muchlowercommitment
activity
requires
oftimethana fulltimejob so thattheriskpremium
will be a largercomponent
of the
is ofroughly
income.The annualcrimeriskpremium
thesameorderof
magnitude
as job riskcompensation,
whichaverages
$900forblue-collar
workers.
Nevertheless,
thereis widespread
beliefthattherisksofbeingapprehendedand sentto prisonare low,and,ifsentto prison,thisoutcome
is muchless severethanbeingkilledon thejob. If therisksof crime
weresmaller
thanthoseposedbyhazardousjobs,riskycriminal
pursuits
wouldclearlydominateriskyjobs as a potentialincomesource.Using
information
fromtheWashington,
D.C., area forthecrimecategories
mostsimilar
tothoseanalyzedhere,I estimate
thateachcrimecommitted
has a probability
of .087 of leadingto arrestand an unconditional
of.014ofbeingconvicted
probability
andserving
timeinjail.14Although
theseestimatesexcludecrimessuch as numbers,whichare seldom
reported,
theyareat leastsuggestive
ofthekindsofrisksassociated
with
property
crimes.In contrast,
theaverageriskofa reported
nonfatal
job
injuryis about1/30peryear,and theaverageriskof a fatality
is about
1/10,000
annually.
The riskof prisonappearsto lie betweenthesetwo
risksin termsofbothitsseverity
and theprobability
involved.
The crimeriskpremium
levelsconsequently
arenotinconsistent
with
availableevidenceregarding
how individualsmake decisionsamong
otherriskyopportunities
to earnincome.In eachcase,activities
posing
additional
riskwillcommand
compensating
differentials.
Legitimate
and
illegitimate
activities
both have upward-sloping
income-risk
profiles.
The primary
distinguishing
characteristic
ofillegitimate
is that
activities
theriskpremiums
have an additionalpolicyimplication
in thatthey
implythatenhancedcriminal
enforcement
willraisetherisksto crime,
thusdiminishing
itsattractiveness.
V. Conclusion
Whencomparedwithotherriskyincome-generating
crime
pursuits,
is clearlyone of the mosthazardousincomesources.Most workers
healthand safety
risksreceivedriskpremiums
facingoccupational
that
13 This estimate,
whichis based on thefindingsin Viscusi(1979),is comparable
to the resultsin otherriskpremiumstudies.Also see Smith(1976, 1979).
14 The crimecategories
I used were reportingrate(burglary,larceny,and auto
theft),conditionalarrestrate (robbery,burglary,larceny,and auto theft),and
conditionalratesof servingtime in jail (robbery,burglary,larceny,auto theft,
narcotics,and others).Differencesin data availabilityand reliabilitygenerated
differences
in the crimecategoriesused.
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theriskpremiums
areunder10% of theirearnedincome.In constrast,
betweenone-half
and two-thirds
of all
constitute
forcriminal
activities

crimeincome.

systemare
Althoughthe risksposed by the criminalenforcement
of imprisof theprobability
notoriously
low, theabsolutemagnitude
onmentformostcrimescommitted
by thesampleis over100 timesas
workerand
largeas theriskof deathfacedby thetypicalblue-collar
The nonrisk
job injury.
aboutone-half
of theaverageriskof a nonfatal
behavioris notgreatsince,formanycrimes
compensation
forcriminal
leisuretimeis nota major
suchas muggings
and cartheft,
theforgone
A person'sdecisionto engagein
component
of the criminalactivity.
suchcrimeswillbe governed
largely
bytheriskthecrimeposesandthe
qualitative
Consequently,
thereis an important
financial
returns
itoffers.
activities
difference
between
andillegitimate
income-generating
legitimate
in termsof both the level of the risk and the natureof the time
allocation.
risksis strong
forcriminal
The empirical
evidenceon thepremiums
and quite robust.The resultspresented
hereindicatethatthereis a
positiverelationbetweencrimeincomelevelsand crimerisks.This
relationwas quite stableforbothmonthlyand yearlycrimeactivity
data. Changesin the specification
of the riskvariable(perceivedvs.
constructed
riskmeasure(ARREST,CONrisks)and in theparticular
of the
altereitherthesignificance
VICT, and PRISON) did notgreatly
linkor themagnitude
oftheimpliedriskpremium.
The positiverisk-rewards
test in
linkageprovidesan alternative
Unlikemoststudiesin
hypothesis.
supportof thecriminaldeterrence
the literature,
problemassociatedwith using
it avoids the intrinsic
levels.The
aggregative
data on crimeratesand criminalenforcement
NBER samplealso offers
theadditional
of makingpossiblea
advantage
a more
jointanalysisof therisksand rewardsof crime,thusproviding
bolster
thefindings
deterrence.
The results
comprehensive
testofcriminal
of criminaldethe empiricalimportance
of otherstudiessupporting
terrence.
In termsof theconceptualfoundations
of thecrimedecision,there
shouldbe littlereasonto disagreethatriskycrimesshouldcommand
to criminal
sanctions.
wagepremiums
or thatcrimeshouldbe responsive
Muchof thecontroversy
has arisen
overdeterrence
issuespresumably
forcriminal
becauseofthemagnitude
oftheeffects
andtheirimplications
usedhave
shortcomings
ofthedatatypically
justicepolicy.The inherent
createdsufficient
to fostera prolongeddebateover the
ambiguities
here
measures.The findings
empiricaleffect
of criminalenforcement
suggestthatthethreatof criminalsanctionsdoes not simplypass the
of
significance
but is a dominantdeterminant
usualtestsof statistical
crimeincome.
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Thestrength
oftheseresults
doesnotimplythateconomic
opportunities
thecriminal
behaviorof thissample.In a companion
do notinfluence
job prospectsalso
paper (see Viscusi1986) I foundthatlegitimate
affected
criminal
behavior.
Whether
crime-related
policiesshouldfocus
enforcement
or improved
economicopportunities
on increased
criminal
on
dependsnotonlyon theextentof thesepolicies'presentinfluence
the
these
criminalbehaviorbut also on
cost of manipulating
policy
variables.
A decisionto tiltthepolicymixin favorof morestringent
of
criminalenforcement
hingeslargelyon the marginalproductivity
such expenditures.
How much,forexample,will an increasein the
thusdeterring
additional
policebudgetaltertheriskof apprehension,
on
crimes?
Although
mydatado notenableme to makeanyjudgments
theenforcement
cost-crime
risklinkage,
thesubsequent
relation
between
criminal
behavior
and criminal
enforcement
risksis verypowerful.
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